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WAS THE ERITREA–ETHIOPIA
CLAIMS COMMISSION MERELY A
ZERO-SUM GAME?: EXPOSING THE
LIMITS OF ARBITRATION IN
RESOLVING VIOLENT
TRANSNATIONAL CONFLICT
Ari Dybnis*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia filed claims against each other in the
Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission (Commission) for humanitarian
international law violations that arose from a violent border dispute
1
between the two countries. Eritrea claimed approximately $6 billion in
2
damages, while Ethiopia countered with claims for approximately
3
$14.3 billion in damages. Nearly ten years later, on August 17, 2009,
4
the Commission reached a final determination on these damage claims.
The Commission awarded approximately $174 million to Ethiopia, and
5
approximately $161 million to Eritrea. The practical result of these
awards, however, is a mere $13 million judgment that Eritrea owes to
* I would like to acknowledge Dawn Shock who first brought the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims
Commission to my attention and Cesare Romano who helped me avoid some serious pitfalls
when I first began structuring my thoughts for this note. I would also like to dedicate this to Josh
Dybnis who would have scrutinized this entire Note purely to challenge me on every argument
and assertion.
1. See Final Award—Ethiopia’s Damages Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 631, ¶ 5 (Eri.–
Eth. Claims Comm’n 2009) [hereinafter EECC Ethiopia Final Award].
2. Eritrea Takes Advantage Over Ethiopia in War Damages Award, REPORTER (Aug. 22,
2009), http://en.ethiopianreporter.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1547.
3. Id.
4. Duncan Hollis, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission Awards Final Damages, OPINIO
JURIS (Aug. 19, 2008, 9:42 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/08/19/Eritrea–Ethiopia-claimscommission-awards-final-damages.
5. Id.
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the Ethiopian government, none of which is assured to reach any of the
6
actual victims of the violence.
There is a common saying that “if something is worth doing, then
it is worth doing right.” In the international context, the “right way” to
redress a wrong is often impractical, infeasible, or even unknowable
until after the fact. It is within this framework that this Note contends
that the Commission was not the “right way” to address the damage that
thousands of victims suffered as a result of the border conflict between
Eritrea and Ethiopia.
The commissioners of the Commission were able to accomplish
admirable feats with their allotted resources and employed some
sophisticated techniques and methodologies to determine the final
awards. However, these ultimately ineffective final awards highlight the
inherent limitations of traditional arbitration as a method for redressing
mass claims of humanitarian violations. The governments should have
utilized modern alternative mechanisms that international bodies have
developed to address mass claims specifically, instead of relying on the
traditional arbitration model. Utilization of these mechanisms would
have increased the chances that the actual victims of the war could
receive any sort of justice.
In Part I, this Note will explain the background of the Commission,
including the history of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia
that raged between 1998 and 2000, the composition of the Commission,
and the Commission’s ten-year history. Part II will explain how the
inherent structural problems in the Commission’s arbitration model
prevent the final monetary awards from providing victims with just
compensation, despite the admirable work done by the commissioners.
These structural problems result in awards that effectively cancel out
without providing any meaningful benefit to the victims. Part II will
also explore how these same structural defects prevented the
Commission from assuring peace and security in the international
community.
Part III will then describe the history and structure of the United
Nations Compensation Commission and the Bosnia Commission for
Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons, two modern examples of
6. The money will go to the governments because the claims were only filed for
government-to-government violations; the Commission, however, “encouraged the Parties to
consider how, in the exercise of their discretion, compensation can best be used to accomplish the
humanitarian objectives” of their peace agreement. EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1,
¶ 25. Without any official mandate it is dubious that the money will actually reach victims, as
explained later in this Note.
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commissions that have enjoyed success. Part III will also discuss the
success of these two commissions as compared to those of the
Commission, and why they should have had a stronger impact on the
latter.
Finally, just because there might exist an alternative “right way,”
there are admittedly many road-blocks that obstruct the implementation
of such mechanisms. The principal obstacles are resources, time, and
the will to implement a better system. Part IV will explore these
impediments and address their impacts, ultimately concluding that
despite these serious considerations, the involved parties could have
implemented a modern claims commission that would have resulted in a
more just outcome.
II. THE ERITREA–ETHIOPIA CONFLICT AND AN AGREEMENT TO
ARBITRATE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A. Conflict Arose from a Dispute over the Border Town of Badme and
Quickly Developed into a Violent Two-Year War
Eritrea and Ethiopia are neighboring countries with intermeshed
histories located in the northeastern part of Africa.7 Eritrea was
previously a province of Ethiopia, but in 1993 the people of Eritrea won
8
their independence. Relative peace existed between the two countries
until 1998, when the two neighbors engaged in a deadly war covering
9
multiple fronts along their common border. This conflict displaced and
10
affected hundreds of thousands of people.
The conflict began in May when the two parties began to fight
11
over who could claim the territory of Badme. Each side blamed the
7. See Eritrea Country Profile, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/country_profiles/1070813.stm.
8. See Partial Award: Civilian Claims—Eritrea’s Claims 15–16, 23, 27–32 (Eri. v. Eth.),
26 R.I.A.A. 197, 205 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2004) [hereinafter EECC Civilian Claims];
Christine Gray, The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Oversteps its Boundaries: A Partial
Award?, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 699, 700 n.3 (2006).
9. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES:
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 33 (Howard M. Holtzmann & Edda Kristjánsdóttir eds.,
2007).
10. Id.; UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Background, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unmee/background.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2011) [hereinafter Background] (“As of March 2000, it was estimated that over 370,000 Eritreans
and approximately 350,000 Ethiopians had been affected by the war. The humanitarian situation
in parts of Ethiopia was exacerbated by the severe drought, which led to the emergence of a major
food crisis with almost 8 million people affected.”).
11. Gray, supra note 8, at 700.
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12

other for instigating the initial fighting. The fundamental conflict
concerned the location of the border between the two countries—what
one side characterized as an invasion, the other characterized as a
13
domestic occupation. Within one month, the fighting spread along the
14
entire border between the two countries. Later the same year, the
15
Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Security
Council both observed the severity of the conflict and attempted to
16
intervene so as to calm the dispute. On December 17, 1998, the
Organization of African Unity drafted a “framework agreement” calling
on Eritrea to withdraw troops from Badme so that the cartographic
section of the United Nations could determine and demarcate the
17
border. Eritrea did not accept the proposal, believing that such a
withdrawal might indicate a concession that the territory belonged to
18
Ethiopia. Consequently, the violence continued to rage.
19
By early 1999, the conflict had escalated into a full-scale war.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations contacted the leaders of
20
Eritrea and Ethiopia and urged them to resolve the matter peacefully.
The countries ignored these pleas and the violence continued until
Eritrea finally accepted the framework agreement on February 27,
21
1999. By this point, Ethiopia’s military position had strengthened and,
22
as a result, Ethiopia refused to accept the agreement. Instead, Ethiopia
demanded that Eritrea automatically recognize Ethiopia’s sovereignty
over all of the territories in dispute, rather than letting the United
23
Nations demarcate the border. Finally, on May 17, 2000, the United

12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Won Kidane, Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The
Jurisprudence of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission in the Hague, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 23,
28 (2007).
15. The Organization of African Unity is now known as the African Union. Organization of
African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU), DEP’T INT’L RELATIONS & COOPERATION, S. AFR.,
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
16. See Gray, supra note 8, at 701.
17. See id. at 701–02.
18. See id. at 702. Oxford Professor Christine Gray argues that Eritrea’s concerns were
ultimately justified by the Commission’s Partial Award on jus ad bellum claims, which assigned
liability for the conflict to Eritrea. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Background, supra note 10.
21. See Gray, supra note 8, at 702.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1298, which imposed
24
sanctions and trade restrictions on the two countries.
B. Fighting Ceased When the Countries Signed the Algiers Agreement,
Which Created the Commission to Arbitrate Violations of Humanitarian
Law
In June 2000, the two countries began to negotiate a ceasefire
25
26
agreement, followed by a full peace agreement in December 2000.
This agreement is known as the “Algiers Agreement,” because the
27
parties negotiated and signed it in Algiers. The parties never published
details of the negotiation, “but it is known that Eritrean and Ethiopian
negotiators and their legal advisers met with legal experts familiar with
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC) in Geneva, and other contemporary Mass Claims
28
Processes.” This agreement was the result of substantial pressure from
29
and efforts by the international community to end the conflict.
The Algiers Agreement called for the creation of three bodies:
(1) an independent body created under the Organization of African
Unity to “determine the origins of the conflict,” (2) a neutral boundary
commission to officially demarcate the border between the two
countries, and (3) a neutral tribunal to arbitrate claims of international
30
law violations. The first body was never established, and the second
31
body is known as the Boundary Commission. The third body is the
32
Commission.

24. See Background, supra note 10; S.C. Res. 1298, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1298 (May 17,
2000).
25. Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the State of Eritrea
and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Eri.–Eth., June 18, 2000,
2138 U.N.T.S. 37273.
26. Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.–Eri., Dec. 12, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 260 [hereinafter
Algiers Agreement]; see also Gray, supra note 8, at 703; Identical Letters Dated 12 December
2000 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations Addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1183 (Dec. 13,
2000).
27. Id.
28. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 34.
29. See id.
30. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, arts. 3–5.
31. See Gray, supra note 8, at 703.
32. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 1; Gray, supra note 8, at 703.
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The Algiers Agreement required that:
[T]he [Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims] Commission is to decide through
binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one
Government against the other, and by nationals (including both
natural and juridical persons) of one party against the Government of
the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party . . . .
The Commission shall not hear claims arising from the cost of
military operations, preparing for military operations, or the use of
force, except to the extent that such claims involve violations of
33
international humanitarian law.

The Algiers Agreement was specific in the overall goal of the
Commission, yet it afforded the Commission an incredible amount of
flexibility in determining particular procedures for handling claims and
34
in modifying its own rules. The adopted rules of procedure and rules
of evidence were original to the Commission, although they were based
on the “Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating
Disputes Between Two States,” which itself is based on the “United
35
Nations Commission on International Trade Law.” In addition, the
Commission still retained the ability to modify the rules after
36
consultation with the parties.
According to the Algiers Agreement, the Commission was to
decide claims resulting from violations of international humanitarian
law, but not claims arising from actual military operations or use of
force, unless they too involved violations of international humanitarian
37
law. The relevant rules of law the Commission followed were:
(1) international conventions, (2) international custom, (3) general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and (4) previous
38
judicial and arbitral decisions.

33. Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 1.
34. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 51.
35. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, Rules of Procedure, art. 1, ¶¶ 1–2 (2000),
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Rules%20of%20Procedure.PDF; Jon Lockart &
Tania Voon, Reviewing Appellate Review in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 6 MELB. J.
INT’L L. 474, 481 (2005).
36. Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, Rules of Procedure, supra note 35, art. 1, ¶ 2.
37. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 1.
38. See Partial Award: Central Front—Ethiopia’s Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 155,
¶ 13 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2004); Partial Award: Prisoners of War—Eritrea’s Claim 17
(Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 23, ¶ 31 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2003) [hereinafter EECC Prisoners
of War].
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The Algiers Agreement also defined the structure and organization
39
of the Commission. It created the Commission under the auspices of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, located in The Hague, which acted
40
as a base and as a registry for the Commission. The Permanent Court
of Arbitration stored and cataloged the parties’ pleadings and acted as a
41
intermediary between the parties and the Commission. Outside of the
services the Permanent Court of Arbitration provided, all costs resulting
42
from the Commission were split equally among the two governments.
As for the actual composition of the Commission, it was comprised
43
of five arbitrators. These commissioners only worked on a part-time
44
basis. Aside from the commissioners and the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, the Commission “employ[ed] no full-time staff” and relied
45
heavily upon email “to limit travel and other costs.”
The structure of the Commission was similar to traditional
arbitration tribunals, yet unlike traditional arbitration mechanisms, the
Algiers Agreement created the Commission to arbitrate a binding and
46
final conclusion without any possibility of appeal. Yet despite
declaring the Commission’s decisions as final and binding, the Algiers
47
Agreement provided no method for enforcement of judgments.
Originally, the mandate for the Commission required a three-year
48
deadline to arbitrate all claims. The Algiers Agreement provided no
procedure for extending this deadline, nor did either party request or
49
attempt to extend this deadline. The Commission therefore only
accepted claims that the parties filed within the first year of its existence
and extinguished all later claims, in an attempt to meet the three-year
50
deadline. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia filed claims past the deadline and

See Kidane, supra note 14, at 29.
See id.
See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 308.
See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 15; PERMANENT COURT OF
ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 362–63.
43. Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 2.
44. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 308.
45. Id.
46. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 17 (“Decisions and awards of the
commission shall be final and binding. The parties agree to honor all decisions and to pay any
monetary awards rendered against them promptly.”).
47. See id.
48. See id. art. 5, ¶ 12.
49. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 162.
50. The Algiers Agreement states that “[a]ll claims submitted to the Commission shall be
filed no later than one year from the effective date of this Agreement . . . . [S]uch claims which
39.
40.
41.
42.
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the Commission refused to consider them due to the lack of timeliness.
As this Note will explore in Part II, this deadline played an important
role in how the Commission evolved. Ultimately, it became very clear
to the commissioners that the three-year deadline was unrealistic and
they agreed to extend the deadline, which is how the Commission then
52
expanded into a ten-year process.
Both Eritrea and Ethiopia asserted a huge variety of claims, so the
Commission decided to lump the States’ claims into categories which it
53
could then systematically address. These categories included:
Category 1 – Claims of natural persons for unlawful expulsion from
the country of their residence; Category 2 – Claims of natural
persons for unlawful displacement from their residence; Category 3 –
Claims of prisoners of war for injuries suffered from unlawful
treatment; Category 4 – Claims of civilians for unlawful detention
and injuries suffered from unlawful treatment during detention;
Category 5 – Claims of persons for loss, damage or injury other than
those covered by the other categories; Category 6 – Claims of [the
54
two party] Governments for loss, damage or injury.

Also, both parties drafted extensive filings that the Commission
then followed with private hearings.55 International aid organizations
and advocacy groups could have provided information to the
government parties, but only the governments themselves were actually
56
allowed to file information with the Commission directly.
C. The Boundary Commission, Partial Awards of the Commission,
Resistance of the Two Parties, and Enforcement Issues
The Boundary Commission, the second commission formed under
the Algiers Agreement, issued its findings in a decision on April 13,

could have been and were not submitted by that deadline shall be extinguished, in accordance
with international law.” Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 8.
51. See Kidane, supra note 14, at 48–51.
52. See Final Award—Eritrea’s Damages Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 505, 518 (Eri.–
Eth. Claims Comm’n 2009) [hereinafter EECC Eritrea Final Award].
53. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n (Eri. v. Eth.), Decision No. 2, available at
http://pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Decision%202.pdf.
54. Id.
55. See generally EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra note 52, ¶¶ 6, 10; EECC Ethiopia Final
Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 6, 10 (discussing the pleadings and hearings that took place).
56. See generally Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, Rules of Procedure, supra note 35,
art. 13 (describing the arbitral procedures of hearings).
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57

2002. The decision indicated that Badme, the site of the original
58
outbreak of violence, was an Eritrean territory. Both parties initially
accepted the border decision on paper, but once the Commission set out
to physically demarcate the border, the decision was met with severe
59
resistance by Ethiopia. Ethiopia refused to allow preparations for the
60
demarcation on the property it controlled. In 2003, Ethiopia wrote a
letter to the United Nations Secretary General declaring that the
Boundary Commission’s decision was “totally illegal, unjust and
61
irresponsible.” In response, Eritrea refused to allow the demarcation of
another part of the border until Ethiopia allowed its portion to be
62
demarcated. The Commission hit a standstill and, as a result, the
Boundary Commission’s work still has yet to be completed, despite
63
numerous United Nations resolutions urging such action.
In October 2005, exasperated by Ethiopia’s refusal to comply with
the boundary ruling, Eritrea refused to cooperate with the United
Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE)—a monitor
64
mission—and forbade its helicopters in Eritrean airspace. As a result,
on July 30, 2008, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1827,65 which terminated the United Nations
66
Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Resolution again implored
Eritrea and Ethiopia to refrain from threats or force against one
57. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Apr. 15, 2002 from the Secretary-General to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2002/423 (Apr. 15, 2002) (by Kofi A. Annan).
58. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Comm’n (Eri. v. Eth.), Decision Regarding Delimitation
of the Border Between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,
¶¶ 5.94–5.95, U.N. Doc. S/2002/423 (Apr. 13, 2002); Gray, supra note 8, at 700, 707–08.
59. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,
U.N. Sec. Council, ¶¶ 3–4, U.N. Doc 2/2002/744 (July 10, 2002).
60. See id. ¶ 4.
61. U.N. Secretary-General, Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and
Eritrea, U.N. Sec. Council, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 2/2003/1186 (Dec. 19, 2003) (containing the
Eleventh Report of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Appendix 1).
62. See id. ¶ 12; U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and
Eritrea, U.N. Sec. Council, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc 2/2005/142 (Mar. 7, 2005) (containing the Sixteenth
Report of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission).
63. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1430, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1430 (Aug. 14, 2002); S.C. Res. 1466, U.N.
Doc S/RES/1466 (Mar. 14, 2003); S.C. Res. 1507, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1507 (Sept. 12, 2003); S.C.
Res. 1531, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1531 (Mar. 12, 2004); S.C. Res. 1560, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1560
(Sept. 14, 2004).
64. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,
¶ 2, U.N Sec. Council, U.N. Doc 2/2006/1 (Jan. 3, 2006).
65. S.C. Res. 1827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1827 (July 30, 2008).
66. Last Peacekeepers Leave UNMEE, U.N. MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA,
http://unmee.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=54&ctl=Details&mid=376&ItemID=368
(last
visited Sept. 6, 2011).
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67

another. Resolution 1827 was one of twenty-eight resolutions the
United Nations Security Council passed between 1998 and 2008,
deploring the violence and demanding an immediate end to hostility,
68
which the two countries continued to ignore.
At the same time, the Commission continued its work and sought
69
to find liability for the conflict of 1998 to 2000. It began this work in
70
March 2001 and came to a conclusion on this issue in December 2005.
In addition to the question of liability, the Commission rendered
71
The Commission heard arguments
multiple “partial awards.”
concerning its first substantive claim, concerning prisoners of war, in
72
December 2002. The Commission submitted a partial award for this
73
claim on July 1, 2003. The Commission held a second hearing,
concerning claims associated with the central front, in November 2003,
74
which was followed by another partial award on April 28, 2004. In all
of these judgments, the Commission found violations of international
75
law on both sides.
In April 2005, the Commission held another hearing concerning
claims that included Eritrea’s Western Front, Aerial Bombardment,
Pensions, Diplomatic, and Non-Resident Property Loss Claims, in
addition to Ethiopia’s Western and Eastern Front, Port, Economic Loss,
76
Diplomatic, and Jus ad Bellum (justification for going to war) claims.
77
It rendered partial awards for all these claims on December 19, 2005.
67. S.C. Res. 1827, supra note 65, ¶ 2.
68. See UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, U.N. Documents,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/resolutions.html
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011) (listing all Resolutions passed during this interval).
69. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION,
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1151 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). Professor
Christine Gray has persuasively argued that this question of liability was outside the jurisdiction
of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claim Commission’s mandate. Because, however, the Organization of
African Unity never formed the first commission described in the Algiers Agreement, the liability
commission, the Commission, had to find liability to conclude its mandate. See generally Gray,
supra note 8, at 714–20 (explaining the Commission’s approach to determining liability for the
war).
70. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 69.
71. Awards are “partial” in that they do not become final until after the subsequent damages
phase. See id.
72. See id.
73. EECC Prisoners of War, supra note 38; Partial Award: Prisoners of War—Ethiopia’s
Claim 4 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 73 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2003).
74. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 69.
75. See Kidane, supra note 14, at 31–33.
76. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 69.
77. See id.
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One of the most important conclusions of these hearings was that
Eritrea actually caused the initial conflict when it carried out a series of
unlawful armed attacks against Ethiopia, violating Article 2, Paragraph
4 of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
78
state. However, the Commission reserved judgment and damage
amounts for a later final award determination. 79
D. The Commission Announces Its Final Damages Award
Determinations
On August 17, 2009, the Commission rendered two final awards
80
on damages. One award was to Eritrea for $161,455,000, plus an
additional $2,065,865 for six individual claimants, and the other award
81
This left a difference of
was to Ethiopia for $174,036,520.
$10,515,655 that Eritrea owed to Ethiopia. These awards were for the
claims that the Commission heard in previous hearings between July 1,
2003, and December 19, 2005, for which it had only made partial
82
awards and no determination on damages.
In reference to these awards, Martin Plaut, an Africa analyst for the
British Broadcasting Corporation, very succinctly explained that the
“real tragedy is that the money, like the rest of the internationally
83
supported peace process, will settle very little.” The following sections
of this Note seek to explain the validity of Plaut’s assertion and to offer
some possible alternatives that the countries and the international
community could have taken to avoid such an unfortunate result.

78. Partial Award: Jus Ad Bellum—Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 457,
¶ 16 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005).
79. See id. ¶ 3.
80. See Press Release, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims
Commission Renders Final Awards on Damages, (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.pca-cpa.org/
upload/files/EECC%20Final%20Awards%20Press%20Release.pdf [hereinafter EECC Press
Release].
81. Hollis, supra note 4.
82. See EECC Press Release, supra note 80.
83. Eritrea to Pay Ethiopia Millions, BBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/8208285.stm.
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III. THE COMMISSION FAILED TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION TO THE
VICTIMS AND AWARDS THAT WOULD MEANINGFULLY FURTHER PEACE
AND SECURITY IN THE REGION
A. At Best, the Final Awards Fund the Coffers of the Warring Parties
But Do Not Adequately Assure Any Compensation to the Actual Victims
for the Harm They Suffered During the Conflict
The damages the Commission granted to the two countries were
primarily for harms suffered by individuals, yet these amounts were not
awarded to the individuals themselves. For example, the Eritrea award
included damages for: loss of business property and buildings; injuries
to civilians due to loss of health care caused by the conflict; damage to
cultural property; mistreatment of prisoners of war; failure to prevent
rape; forcible expulsions; arbitrary deprivation of citizenship for dual
citizens; failure to provide care to expelled nationals; failure to provide
compensation for vehicles requisitioned by nonresident citizens; other
property losses of nonresident citizens; imprisonment under harsh
conditions for civilians on security charges; violations of diplomatic
84
premises and property; and interference with departing diplomats.
This discrepancy was also true for Ethiopia’s claims that included
damages for:
death, injury, disappearance, forced labor, and
conscription of citizens; failure to prevent rape; destruction and looting
of houses; looting and damage to government buildings and
infrastructure; destruction and looting of religious institutions;
mistreatment of prisoners of war; failure to protect citizens from threats
and violence; failure to ensure Ethiopian citizens in Eritrea access to
employment; failure to assure that Ethiopians received medical care
comparable to Eritrean citizens; wrongful detention of civilians; failure
to protect property of detainees expelled from Eritrea; and failure to
85
ensure the safe repatriation of departing Ethiopians.
As the Commission found in an earlier partial ruling that ultimate
liability for the conflict laid with Eritrea, the Ethiopian award included
damages for jus in bello (conduct during war) claims and jus ad bellum
(justification for going to war) claims.86 Therefore, the Ethiopian award
also included jus ad bellum damages for: human suffering and loss of
income associated with internal displacement of persons; civilian death
and injury; damage to civilian property; damage to public buildings and
84. See EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra note 52, at 629–30, ¶¶ 1–18.
85. See EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, at 768–69, § A, ¶¶ 1–19.
86. See id. ¶ 7.
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infrastructure; looting and destruction of religious institutions; death
and injury caused by Eritrean landmines; destruction of government
facilities and other government losses; lost profits for certain private
businesses; and reconstruction and assistance to internally displaced
87
persons.
More significantly, individual human beings felt the consequences
of these violations, such as the claims for rape and forced labor;
however, the Commission awarded the final monetary damages solely
to the States, and not to the individual victims or to the States as trustees
88
for the individual victims. In its final decisions, the Commission
repeatedly “encouraged” the parties to consider how the awards could
be used to accomplish humanitarian objectives or compensate the
89
victims, and it also requested the parties explain how they intended to
90
distribute the damages. Yet there was no demand for the States to take
91
any specific actions with the awards. Because the awards were not
conditional on the countries’ compensating the individual victims
within their borders, the final awards will essentially fill the general
coffers of the respective countries to be spent as the countries see fit.
This result, however, was not solely the fault of the commissioners
when reaching their conclusion on damages. It was necessary for the
Commission to award damages in this way because, for the most part,
the countries only filed claims for nation-to-nation harms, rather than
92
harms that the nations caused against individual victims.
The Commission established a mass claims process by which the
93
parties could have filed claims for individuals. This process included
94
fixed tiers of compensation for individual claims. The different tiers
87. See id. at 769–70, § B, ¶¶ 1–17.
88. See id. ¶ 3.
89. See, e.g., id. ¶ 25 (“[T]he Commission has encouraged the Parties to consider how, in
exercise of their discretion, compensation can best be used to accomplish the humanitarian
objectives of Article 5(1) of the Agreement.”); id. ¶ 82 (“Any compensation goes to the claimant
State, not to injured individuals (although the Commission remains confident that the Parties are
mindful of their responsibility, within the scope of the resources available to them, to ensure that
their nationals who are victims of the conflict receive relief).”).
90. See, e.g., id. ¶ 11(1) (“[T]he Commission requests that the Parties inform it in their first
filings how they intend to ensure distribution of damages received to civilian victims, including
presently available information on existing or anticipated structures and procedures for this
purpose.”).
91. See id. ¶ 3.
92. See id.
93. Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n (Eri. v. Eth.), Decision No. 5, § B, available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Decision%205.pdf [hereinafter EECC Decision No. 5].
94. See id.
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depended upon how many categories of damages corresponded with
95
each individual’s claim. The two parties were to provide standard
paper and electronic claim forms, based on the forms that the
96
Commission planned to prepare for any individual claims. The
Commission intended to use computers and docket management
software to select sample groups, using expert advised characteristics as
a guide when setting sufficient compensation for certain sub-groupings
97
of claims. This procedure was a very innovative and progressive
measure that could have streamlined the imposing project.
Nonetheless, one of the major failures of this scheme was that the
Algiers Agreement did not address any mechanism to inform potential
98
claimants of their eligibility to file claims under the Commission.
99
Instead, this responsibility was left to the States themselves.
Additionally, the Algiers Agreement did not give priority to these
individual claims over the nation-to-nation claims, nor did it mandate
that the nations file these individual claims if they decided to file
nation-to-nation claims.100 Consequently, despite the availability of this
mass claims option, the parties chose only to file government-togovernment claims, with the exception of six claims which Eritrea filed
101
on behalf of six individuals whom Ethiopia had expelled.
These problems might not have resulted in the abandonment of
individual claims had it not been for the deadline that the Commission
set for the collection of claims and the time that it would take to
adequately collect individuals’ claims. The mandate for the Commission
102
called for a three-year deadline to arbitrate all claims. Accordingly, to
adhere to this timetable, the Commission only accepted claims filed
103
within the first year of its existence, extinguishing all later claims.
Further, the Algiers Agreement provided no procedure for extending
104
this deadline. If not for this deadline, then the parties might have
considered collecting individuals’ claims and utilizing the mass claims
procedure.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. §§ B–C.
See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 155.
See id. at 252.
See id. at 146.
Id.
See id. at 155.
See EECC Civilian Claims, supra note 8, ¶ 18.
See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5.
See id. art. 5, ¶ 8.
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 162.
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The Commission actually noted that filing inter-State claims
instead of individual claims was understandable, “given limits of time
105
and resources.”
Additionally, experts from the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), who were serving the Commission
as technical consultants, also expressed the opinion that an adequate
mass claims procedure required more time to collect claims than the
106
designated one-year deadline.
Paradoxically, this deadline was a
significant factor in inhibiting the parties from filing individuals’
claims, as the deadline was a result of the Commission’s attempt to
hasten its work to meet the “recurring concern that the proceeds
accruing from the damages proceedings be used by the Parties to assist
107
civilian victims of the conflict.”
The deadline set by the Commission does not solely explain why
the parties chose to abandon the mass claims option. In addition to the
deadline, there appears to have been a lack of will among the parties to
find compensation for individuals who suffered harm. This is first
illustrated by the fact that neither party requested nor attempted to
108
extend the filing deadline. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia disregarded the
time limit and attempted to file inter-State claims past the deadline, yet
109
never attempted to file individuals’ claims.
Furthermore, once it
became clear that the three-year timetable to handle all claims was
unrealistic, the commissioners agreed to extend the three-year
110
deadline. It is reasonable to assume that if the commissioners were
willing to extend the deadline for the Commission’s work, then they
may have been willing to extend the filing deadline if the parties had
expressed such a desire. Additionally, a lack of will to file individual
claims is also evidenced by the fact that the parties did not push for
separate individual claims, despite having already documented
individuals’ claims on claim forms in an effort to facilitate the
111
There was
preparation of damages for the States’ own actions.
actually a system in place for individual claims, but the two countries
involved did not care to use it, the Commission made it harder for these
105. EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, ¶ 25.
106. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 156.
107. EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, ¶ 10.
108. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 162.
109. See Kidane, supra note 14, at 48.
110. See id. at 31–32.
111. Eritrea collected 28,815 forms (25,595 claiming loss or damage to personal property and
3,220 claiming damage to business) from individuals to support the number the country claimed
Ethiopia owed it for part of its claim. See EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, ¶ 56.
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countries to use it, and the Commission never organized the process in a
way that forced the parties to give priority to individual claims for
humanitarian violations.
B. The Ten Million Dollar Difference Between Ethiopia’s Award of
$174,036,520 and Eritrea’s Award of $161,455,000 Did Not Provide
Adequate Compensation
An award of over a hundred million dollars may seem like a lot of
money to the average person, but to the average nation state it is a
pittance. Yet an award in this range could be significant to an extremely
impoverished country. The award is sizeable enough to provide some
sort of deterrence against disapproved future actions and could provide
at least some relief to victims. This is probably the thought process of
the Commission when it made its final awards.
However, in a broader context, these awards are drastically
insufficient. Because the damages are an exchange of money between
states, the majority of, or entirety of, the award one country receives
will only cover the amount owed to the other. This exchange results in
an approximately $10 million difference that Eritrea owes Ethiopia.
This is only 0.25% of the annual gross domestic product (GDP) of
112
which has a relatively small GDP as one of the poorest
Eritrea,
113
nations in the world. The amount is insignificant in part because the
Commission heavily discounted the final award amounts, leaving it
impossible for either party to be fairly compensated.
Even if the full amount of the final awards went directly to
compensating victims of Ethiopia and Eritrea’s unlawful actions then
there still would not be just compensation because the amount was
inadequate. The commissioners had the herculean task to wade through
the mass of information which the two parties provided it to concoct a
reasonable figure for damage awards. After tabulating reasonable
amounts, however, the Commission then discounted many of these
114
and then
amounts depending on the reliability of the evidence,
discounted these amounts even further due to consideration of the
wealth, or lack thereof, of the two countries. 115 This deep, and in many
112. See The World Factbook:
Eritrea, U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/er.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2011)
113. Eritrea ranks 168th in world economies. See id.
114. EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, ¶ 38 (“[C]ompensation levels also have been
reduced, balancing the uncertainties flowing from the lower standard of proof.”).
115. See EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra note 52, at 507–08.
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cases seemingly arbitrary, discounting resulted in final award amounts
that were far from the amounts the Commission determined as fair
compensation for the parties’ wrongful actions.
In the opening paragraphs of the final award decisions, the
Commission explained that the awards “probably do not reflect the
totality of damages that either Party suffered in violation of
international law. Instead, they reflect the damages that could be
established with sufficient certainty through the available evidence in
the context of complex international legal proceedings carried out by
the Parties with modest resources and under necessary pressures of
time.”116
These opening lines explain the balance the Commission attempted
to strike between certainty and fair compensation. Essentially, it
concedes that the awards are not adequate, and reveal that there are
issues with the Commission’s structure that inherently restricted it from
allowing a fair resolution of the circumstances.
The Commission depended solely upon the information that the
two parties provided to it. Other organizations could have presented
evidence to the parties, but not directly to the Commission. 117
Additionally, the Commission did not have the staff or resources to
conduct its own investigations.118 Therefore, it often did not have
sufficient evidence and had to resort to employing “estimation” or
“guesswork” to determine the amount of compensation for particular
119
For example, the Commission found that the Eritreans
claims.
suffered significant losses of property at the hands of Ethiopian forces
120
during the invasion, yet the evidence presented did not quantify the
121
The Commission did indicate that the
magnitude of that injury.
evidence was available, but that the Commission “d[id] not have time or
122
resources” to review the information. Instead, the Commission relied
123
These estimates are
upon “a reasonable estimate of the losses.”
problematic.

116. Id. at 507.
117. See generally Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, Rules of Procedure, supra note 35,
art. 13 (describing the hearing process for the proceedings between Ethiopia and Eritrea).
118. See id. ¶ 71.
119. EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, ¶ 37.
120. EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra note 52, ¶ 70.
121. Id.
122. Id. ¶ 71.
123. Id. ¶ 72.
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When there was insufficient evidence for a claim, as often was the
case, this type of “guesswork” became the default method for
determining a conclusion.124 The result had to be either an amount that
was completely false, because it was the product of a guess, or grossly
ineffective, as the Commission was erring on the side of caution in that
125
case.
In addition to the problems with the first type of discounting, the
Commission also discounted to account for the wealth of the two
126
countries. This type of discounting was not totally unreasonable. As
the Commission points out, the amount of damages that Ethiopia
127
requested was three times the entire GDP of Eritrea in 2005. The
Commission was therefore concerned that since the countries were so
poor and the damages so high, serious damages would further
destabilize peace in the region, similar to what happened with the
128
Treaty of Versailles and Germany after World War I.
Furthermore, the Commission was concerned that because the
countries were so poor, large awards would cripple the governments’
ability to pay for the essential services that their people needed, and
would force the governments to neglect their obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and
129
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These were
serious considerations. The Commission’s purpose was to foster peace,
stability, and compensate victims, not to further destabilize the region or
take away services from the survivors of war. However, as reasonable
as it sounds, this conclusion is problematic for various reasons.
First, the Commission’s choice to abandon true compensation and
adequate justice for victims in favor of political stability was just as
likely to foster resentment and instability as payment of large awards.
The Commission’s choice assured that the victims of the war would
never receive the compensation they were due for their harms. Second,
the Commission took a short-term view of the problem; there are
countless examples of extremely poor countries that in a relatively short
124. See id. at 508.
125. See id. The Commission would in some cases award no compensation at all for claims
when it did not have sufficient evidence. See, e.g., id. ¶ 307.
126. EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, ¶ 18 (“In assessing both Parties’ damages
claims, the Commission has been mindful of the harsh fact that these countries are among the
poorest on earth.”).
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 315.
129. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.

2011]

Exposing the Limits of Arbitration

273

period of time transformed into significant global economic leaders,
such as China or Germany.130
Unlike the Treaty of Versailles, the Algiers Agreement provided
no mechanism for enforcement or a timetable for distribution of the
131
Consequently, the Commission could have provided that
awards.
repayment for the majority of the awards be dependent upon the size of
the countries’ economies, not upon any time deadline. If the countries
were to become able to pay the damages without causing detriment to
their own citizens, then they would. Otherwise, the amounts that the
parties owed could stay close to the current discounted awards. This
payment structure would have at least allowed for an opportunity to
provide the victims with just compensation instead of discounted
awards, a decision that guarantees that there will be no comparable
opportunity.
The problems related to the discounting of the awards and the fact
that the awards negate each other would not be as problematic if the
money exchanged between the two countries went directly to victims
rather than to the other State’s general coffers. That still would have
stood in the way of fair compensation for everyone, but it would not
have been as extreme, and at least could have provided compensation
for some. For example, the Commission awarded Eritrea and Ethiopia
each two million dollars in parallel awards “for failing to prevent the
rape of known and unknown victims in the towns of Senafe, Barentu
132
and Teseney.” The Commission did so with the “hope that Eritrea
(and Ethiopia) [would] use the funds awarded to develop and support
133
health programs for women and girls in the affected areas.” In reality,
Eritrea and Ethiopia will merely exchange checks for identical sums of
money. Essentially, the result will be the same regardless of whether the
Commission awards ten times the amount of money, or awards no
money at all. On the other hand, if the States pay the rape victims
directly or pay organizations that provide support to the rape victims,
130. See Justin Yifu Lin, Development and Transition: Idea, Strategy, and Viability 7 (China
Ctr. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. E2007007, 2007), available at http://en.ccer.edu.cn/
download/6401-1.pdf.
131. See The Peace Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Part IX: Financial Clauses, art. 259,
available at http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/versa8.html (describing enforcement and time
requirements for Germany to pay its financial obligations under the Treaty); Algiers Agreement,
supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 17 (merely providing that “[t]he parties agree to honor all decisions and to
pay any monetary awards rendered against them promptly).
132. EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra note 52, ¶ 239.
133. Id.
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then the award, regardless of the amount, would at least have some
impact.
C. It Is Doubtful the Final Awards Furthered Peace and Stability
Between the Two Countries
Aside from the issue of just compensation, a serious question
arises as to whether the final award will truly further the peace and
stability between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This was the primary goal of the
peace which the parties brokered in Algiers and from which the
Commission arose.134 The long term impact of the final awards is still
unclear; nevertheless, the immediate effects are troubling. Neither
Eritrea nor Ethiopia has expressed satisfaction with the results of the
Commission. In the opening paragraphs of the final award decisions, the
Commission noted that the “awards of monetary compensation for
damages are less—probably much less—than the Parties believe to be
135
due.”
The Ethiopian government has explicitly and publically expressed
136
its dissatisfaction with the Commission’s ruling. Eritrea has accepted
the award due to the final and binding nature of the Algiers Agreement,
137
but has also expressed reservations about the final award amounts.
Additionally, Eritrea continues to express its dissatisfaction to the
United Nations Security Council over the international community’s
138
treatment of the conflict. This dissatisfaction has partially resulted in
139
Eritrea isolating itself from the international community. As of the
time of this Note, Ethiopia has still refused to allow the United Nations
to demarcate the border with Eritrea.140 Eritrea has, as a result, further
134. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, arts. 1–2.
135. EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra note 52, ¶ 2.
136. Desalegn Sisay & Konye Obaji Ori, Ethiopia and Eritrea to Pay for War Damages:
Ethiopia Not Satisfied with Ruling, AFRIK-NEWS.COM (Aug. 19, 2009), http://en.afrik.com/
article16061.html (“The Ethiopian government is dissatisfied with the commission’s ruling, after
they (the commission) found out that Eritrea was the offender and had dragged Ethiopia into the
grave war said the ministry. It also said, Ethiopia will further study the details of the final award
and measures that could be taken to ensure what is owed to Ethiopia by Eritrea is settled.”).
137. See Press Release, Statement of the Government of Eritrea on the Award of the Claims
Commission (Aug. 18, 2009), available at http://adalvoice.wordpress.com/2009/08/18/eritreaaccepts-the-award-of-the-claims-commission/.
138. See Jeremy Clarke, Eritrea Dismisses New Border Violence Accusation, REUTERS
(Oct. 29, 2009, 12:25 PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE59S0H320091029?
pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0.
139. See id.
140. Eritrea–Ethiopia: UN Urges Ethiopia to Cooperate with Border Commission, IRIN,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=47953 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
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isolated itself from the international community, and no money has been
exchanged between Eritrea and Ethiopia for the victims of the border
war. Relations between the parties have not progressed since they
brokered the Algiers Agreement, despite the ten years’ work of the
141
Commission.
IV. INSTEAD OF A TRADITIONAL ARBITRATION MODEL, THE COMMISSION
SHOULD HAVE MORE HEAVILY RELIED UPON THE MODEL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE COMMISSION FOR REAL
PROPERTY CLAIMS OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES
This Note has presented flaws in the Commission, flaws in the
final awards, and the consequences of these problems. The solution to
many of these problems are systematic and could have been avoided if
the structure of the Commission was, from the beginning, dramatically
altered to match modern mass claim techniques utilized by the United
Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) and the Commission for
Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees.
A. The Success of the United Nations Compensation Commission in
Resolving Mass Claims Efficiently and with Relative Speed
The UNCC is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations Security
Council, which the Security Council established in 1991 to compensate
142
victims of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC did
not have the task of deciding liability, but only determining damages, as
the Security Council had already found that Iraq was liable for any
143
losses that resulted from the invasion or occupation. The UNCC also
had a similar task to that of the Commission’s after it had made its
partial rulings; however, that is the extent of the similarities between the
two bodies.
As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated:
[T]he Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which
the parties appear; it is a political organ that performs an essentially
fact-finding function of examining claims, verifying their validity,
evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolving disputed claims;
141. See THE INT’L CRISIS GRP., ERITREA: THE SIEGE STATE, AFRICA REPORT NO. 163 22–
26 (2010), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopiaeritrea/163%20Eritrea%20The%20Siege%20State.pdf.
142. Introduction, U.N. COMPENSATION COMM’N, http://www.uncc.ch/introduc.htm (last
visited Sept. 6, 2011).
143. See id.
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it is only in this last respect that a quasi-judicial function may be
involved.144

The damages that the UNCC established were drawn directly from
145
a special account that sales of Iraqi oil funded.
The SecretaryGeneral, however, initially recommended that the amounts paid by Iraq
146
should not exceed thirty percent of the value of its oil exports. The
amount was ultimately reduced to twenty-five percent, pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1330, but the UNCC enacted the general
147
scheme that the Secretary-General recommended.
The UNCC has been a resounding success. Since the Security
Council established the UNCC in 1991, victims have filed more than
2.6 million claims and have sought a total of approximately $368 billion
148
in compensation.
Out of these claims, the UNCC awarded
compensation for 1,543,619 claims and, as of January 27, 2011,
149
distributed a total of $31,303,180,576. The vast majority of these
150
claims came from individuals for relatively small amounts. Victims
filed all of these claims in a six-year span, with many of the claims
falling under a January 1, 1995, deadline; other claims falling under a
January 1, 1996, deadline; and the last group of claims falling under a
151
February 1, 1997, deadline. The UNCC finished its processing task in
152
2005 and made its last payments to individuals in 2007.
The UNCC was able to efficiently resolve a huge volume of cases
and distribute a large volume of payments, while still safeguarding
against frivolous claims, because it utilized a modern approach to mass
claim processing.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. The Claims, U.N. COMPENSATION COMM’N, http://www.uncc.ch/theclaims.htm (last
visited Sept. 6, 2011).
149. Status of Processing and Payment of Claims, U.N. COMPENSATION COMM’N,
http://www.uncc.ch/status.htm (last updated Sept. 6, 2011).
150. Norbert Wühler, Institutional and Procedural Aspects of Mass Claims Settlement
Systems: The United Nations Compensation Commission, in INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS OF MASS CLAIMS SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 17, 18 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration ed., 2000) [hereinafter Institutional and Procedural Aspects of Mass Claims
Settlement Systems: The United Nations Compensation Commission].
151. The Claims, supra note 148.
152. U.N. COMPENSATION COMM’N, http://www.uncc.ch/start.htm (last updated July 29,
2008).
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One technique that the UNCC employed was to break down the
153
types of claims which people could file into categories. Four of these
categories provided for individual claims, one for corporate claims, and
154
The UNCC dealt with the individual
one for government claims.
155
claims first and then addressed the other claims. This assured that
priority was given to individual victims before governments. It also
grouped and processed claims by common legal, factual, and valuation
156
issues.
Norbert Wühler, a former UNCC chief, observed that,
“[g]iven the traditional emphasis in previous claims resolution
processes on the losses suffered by governments and corporations, this
humanitarian decision to focus first on urgent individual claims marked
157
a significant step in the evolution of international claims practice.”
Another UNCC innovation was the use of computer software to
match claims and information sampling to examine claims against
158
existing databases and statistical models. This system contributed to
the speed and efficiency with which it was able to work, as the UNCC
could then quickly determine whether there was documentation to
159
justify an award.
The UNCC also employed two different evidentiary standards:
one for individual claims and one for businesses or government
160
claims. “Appropriate evidence” of the circumstances and amount of
the loss was sufficient as long as the evidence reached a “reasonable
161
The UNCC, however, demanded
minimum” for the former.
documentation and other appropriate evidence “sufficient to
162
demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the loss” for the latter.
In order to verify and evaluate the claims and evidence, the UNCC
163
made considerable use of experts, consultants, and other specialists.
In addition to relying on experts, the UNCC had access to several fact
153. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 56.
154. Id. at 57.
155. Id. at 56–57.
156. Id. at 248.
157. Norbert Wühler, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New Contribution
to the Process of International Claims Resolution, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 249, 261 (1999).
158. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 248–49.
159. See Francis E. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation
Commission, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 185 (2009).
160. Institutional and Procedural Aspects of Mass Claims Settlement Systems: The United
Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 150, at 20–21.
161. Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
162. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted).
163. Id.
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finding studies that the United Nations had commissioned shortly after
the liberation of Kuwait, but before the filing of claims was even an
164
option. These studies provided essential information for the UNCC in
165
its work. These reports were effective because they were prepared
under the authority of the United Nations and not one of the interested
166
parties.
The UNCC also created specific claim forms that it then
167
distributed to governments. A standardized claim form allowed the
UNCC to more easily process the forms and avoid the issues with the
168
claim forms which Eritrea and Ethiopia created. Governments and
organizations filed individual claims with the UNCC; however, the
governments acted as trustees for individuals.169 Conversely, the
Commission processed individuals’ claims only as a means to reach a
conclusion on the two government parties’ claims.170
Much of the strength of the UNCC rested in its ability to safeguard
individual claimants by using an inquisitorial process rather than an
adversarial process. As one law professor explained:
The use of an inquisitorial type of procedure for the claim resolution
process has been described as the “signal distinction” of the
Commission. . . . [A]n adversarial process would not have been able
to achieve fundamental fairness for the individual claimants or Iraq.
[It] would have likely resulted in patently unfair outcomes due to
decisions based primarily on technical grounds, rather than the
substantive merit of the claims.171

A judicial or arbitral solution is useful in many circumstances but
the organizers of the UNCC recognized that, in a situation involving
mass claims for humanitarian violations, an inquisitorial model is more
appropriate.172 This had become apparent, in part, when past attempts to
164. John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Balancing of
Rights Between Individual Claimants and the Government of Iraq, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 141, 167 (2005).
165. See id. at 167–68.
166. See id. at 167, 168 n.100.
167. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 150.
168. The Commission actually disregarded a large amount of claim forms that Eritrea had
created because Eritrea did not make them appropriately. See EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra
note 52, ¶¶ 69–72.
169. See The Claims, supra note 148.
170. See EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, ¶ 3 (explaining that the process was not
intended to determine appropriate individual compensation, but to determine broader awards for
the states as claimants).
171. Chung, supra note 164, at 162.
172. See id.
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utilize the former model resulted in chaos.173 The unwieldy Iran–United
States Claims Tribunal, a tribunal based on the traditional arbitration
174
model similar to that of the Commission, is one example. The Iran–
United States Claims Tribunal worked at a very slow pace and had great
175
difficulty with individual claims due to a lack of causation evidence.
The Commission should have learned from the past and referred to the
UNCC’s established practices.
B. The Success of the Commission for Real Property Claims of
Displaced Persons and Refugees in Resolving Mass Claims Efficiently
and with Relative Speed
The Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons
and Refugees (CRPC) was an international commission established to
process and resolve claims by Bosnians who sought to reacquire
property lost or left in the Bosnia–Herzegovina conflict of 1992 to
176
1995. The CRPC was established in 1996 and completed its work in
177
During this period, the CRPC rendered a total of 311,757
2003.
decisions,178 an incredible number of claims for such a short period of
time. These decisions “are estimated to have benefitted close to one
179
million people.”
Like the Commission, the CRPC arose out of a peace agreement,
180
the Dayton Peace Agreement, which sought to end the Bosnian war.
181
First, staff
The CRPC accepted claims directly from individuals.
members interviewed claimants to gather evidence and then sorted the
182
information in a computer database. The CRPC also crafted the forms
for the claimants to fill out so that they were comprehensive and user183
To make a binding decision, a panel of judges then
friendly.
173. See id. at 175.
174. See id. at 174–75.
175. Id. at 174 (“While most of the claims before the Iran Tribunal were settled,
approximately 250 claims were arbitrated to a decision. It took ten years to arbitrate these 250
claims to conclusion.”).
176. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 23.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 24.
179. Id.
180. Hans van Houtte, Mass Property Claim Resolution in a Post-War Society: The
Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in INSTITUTIONAL AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF MASS CLAIMS SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 23, 24 (Int’l Bureau of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2000).
181. See id. at 32.
182. Id. at 33.
183. Id.
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examined the evidentiary record, information from the interviews, and
184
any existing official registries.
Like the UNCC, there was no
185
adversarial process.
The CRPC returned the title of property to many individuals;
however, it did so knowing that the local authorities were still
186
responsible for facilitating the return of all real property. This means
that a remedy for these victims might not be available for some time,
but at least the victims have the authority for future legal action when it
187
becomes politically feasible. This is the appropriate long-term view
of remedies that the Commission should have taken.
C. A Similar Political Commission Solution is More Viable than a
Judicial Solution Due to the History of, and Current Power Struggle
Between, Eritrea and Ethiopia
The UNCC, the CRPC, and the countries involved in those two
structures have many similarities to the Commission and the parties
involved in that Commission. The countries involved in all of these, for
the most part, were relatively poor and had recently been through
significant military conflicts.188 Indeed, each crisis is unique and will
require its own approach. For example, Iraq is unique in that it had a
strong source of revenue in oil.189 Despite these differences, there are
still enough similarities between these structures that there will always
be important lessons from which future commissions can draw. It is
evident that the Commission could have achieved more success by more
closely following the examples of prior mass claims processes.

184. See id. at 33, 39–40.
185. See id. at 33.
186. Id. at 41.
187. Id. at 42 (“It would be unrealistic to expect that the Commission’s decisions, which go
against the political and even financial interests of the local power structure, will immediately be
fully recognised or implemented by the local authorities. However, even if implementation in the
short term may give rise to some problems, the decisions have been formally taken and are in the
hands of the public. Sooner or later they have to be implemented. In Germany owners had to wait
for 50 years but their titles to property located in the former German Democratic Republic were
finally recognised after the reunification.”).
188. These countries include Bosnia, Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kuwait. U.N. Compensation
Comm’n Governing Council, Special Report and Recommendations Made by the “D1” Panel of
Commissioners Concerning 223 Claims of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Departure from Iraq or
Kuwait (Category “A” Claims), ¶¶ 1(a), 18, U.N. Sec. Council, U.N. Doc S/AC.26/2000/15 (Sept.
29, 2000).
189. Iraq Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://205.254.135.24/countries/countrydata.cfm?fips=IZ (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
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V. TIME, RESOURCES, AND WILL ARE POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO
SELECTING AND IMPLEMENTING A PROCESS THAT UTILIZES SUCCESSFUL
FEATURES OF PAST MASS CLAIMS MECHANISMS, BUT THESE OBSTACLES
ARE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE
There are justifiable reasons why the Commission handled only
inter-State claims and followed a traditional arbitration model, albeit
with a few innovative measures, instead of handling individual claims
through a modern mass claims process like the aforementioned
commissions. The most significant reasons are time, resources, and will;
however, in hindsight, these three impediments are not impassable road
blocks.
Arguably, the most imposing barrier is the lack of money and
resources. The Commission repeatedly bemoaned its lack of sufficient
resources and how this inhibited them from performing at a high
190
level. At one point, the Commission directly contrasted itself to the
UNCC, explaining that it could not achieve what the Compensation
191
Commission did for lack of resources. These complaints are accurate
and fair. Both the UNCC and the CRPC had much larger budgets than
the Commission and employed much larger staffs. The administrative
costs of the UNCC from the time it began through 2005 totaled $362.6
192
million. Conversely, the CPRC had a much smaller budget; it used
193
approximately $33.49 million from 1997 to 2003.
Consequently, both commissions had a much larger working staff
than the Commission. The UNCC had “[a]t its height . . . approximately
194
three hundred professional and general services staff.” The CRPC
195
even had over 250 staff members running its operations.
Alternatively, the Commission was comprised of only five
196
As opposed to the other commissioners, these
commissioners.
197
The Permanent
commissioners worked only on a part-time basis.
Court of Arbitration provided some support, but the Commission
198
The actual expense figures for the
employed no full-time staff.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra note 52, ¶ 71.
Id.
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 349.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 302.
Van Houtte, supra note 180, at 26.
See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 2.
See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 308.
Id.
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Commission have not been made public yet, but it is known that it was
199
quite modest in relation to these other commissions.
As modest as the budget may have been, it did not have to stand in
the way of utilizing an efficient and effective mass claims procedure.
First, gathering and sharing technologies developed by past tribunals
200
should lower the cost of future ones. Accordingly, the Commission
did not have to reinvent the wheel and its costs did not have to be as
significant as that of the UNCC. Second, because the Commission was
tailored as an adversarial model, both Eritrea and Ethiopia must have
spent a substantial sum on attorneys’ fees and expert legal consultants,
which instead could have been used to supplement the budget. For five
to ten years, Ethiopia employed eleven lawyers and consultants and
Eritrea employed seventeen lawyers and consultants to work on their
201
cases before the Commission. Third, the necessary costs are not truly
overly imposing. For all that it did, the UNCC’s budget was only
actually 0.1% of the amount of claims asserted before the
202
Commission. Furthermore, the entire cost of the UNCC’s fourteen
years of operation was roughly only a half a percent of Ethiopia’s
203
annual gross domestic product
and only nine percent of Eritrea’s
204
annual gross domestic product.
Additionally, the costs should not have barred a modern mass
claims process that would have been more successful in providing just
compensation, because the Commission had already done a lot of the
205
work in creating a model for such a procedure. This underscores how
the excuse of funding can really be a veiled justification when there is a
lack of will. The lack of will was not only present within the
Commission and the participating States, but also in the international
community. The amount of money necessary for a mass claims
procedure is very insignificant in relation to the global economy, and it
is not unprecedented that, in the interest of peace and security, the
199. Id. at 352.
200. See Howard M. Holtzmann, Mass Claims Systems: Potentials and Pitfalls, in
INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF MASS CLAIMS SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 1, 6 (Int’l
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2000).
201. See EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, at 639–40.
202. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 349.
203. Ethiopia’s GDP as of 2008 was $72.24 billion. The World Factbook: Ethiopia, U.S.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/et.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
204. Eritrea’s GDP as of 2008 was $3.877 billion. See The World Factbook: Eritrea, supra
note 112.
205. See EECC Decision No. 5, supra note 93, § B.
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international community has funded similar projects. For example, the
majority of the CRPC’s budget was paid by a collection of international
206
states. Furthermore, the international community spent $1.32 billion,
a significantly higher amount than would be necessary for a mass claims
207
procedure, to support the UNMEE mission.
Another issue is the source of funds necessary to fairly compensate
the victims. In Iraq, the UNCC was able to levy a portion of Iraq’s oil
revenue to compensate the victims,208 but neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia
has an industry that is as reliably profitable.209 Nevertheless, if the
countries were able to find enough resources to engage in war, then
there should have been no excuse to find the money necessary to
compensate the victims of their war. The amount spent on the war was
not negligible either; Ethiopia paid approximately three billion
210
dollars.
Furthermore, compensation need not be immediate, as it could be a
long-term, structured project. The possibility of compensation in the
future is better than none at all. As the citizens of the countries involved
are very poor, the amounts necessary for individual claims should be
relatively insubstantial. This was the case with the UNCC where the
211
amounts for individual claims were relatively small amounts.
However, small awards can make a huge difference to these individual
victims.
Before the UNCC began, there were critics who claimed that the
project was doomed because there would never be enough money to
212
award all of the claims. This was not a reason to abandon the project,
however. Indeed, the UNCC was consequently able to compensate a
213
large number of victims.

206. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 359–60.
207. UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Facts and Figures, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/facts.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2011).
208. McGovern, supra note 159, at 187–88.
209. See The World Factbook: Ethiopia, supra note 203; The World Factbook: Eritrea,
supra note 112.
210. Violations of Academic Freedom in Ethiopia, Jan. 24, 2003, A1502, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f4f59533.html.
211. See McGovern, supra note 159, at 188.
212. Charles N. Brower, Lessons to be Drawn from the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal, 9 J. INT’L
ARB. 50, 56 (1992) (stating that “[t]here will never, by any projection that anyone has seen, be
enough money to pay 100 per cent of the claims” before the UNCC).
213. See McGovern, supra note 159, at 188.
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The final substantial impediment is time. Dr. Norbert Wühler, the
director of the IOM, highlighted that “in every mass claims programme,
a tension exists . . . between the search for individual justice and
fairness and the requirement of an expedient process that resolves all the
214
claims within a reasonable time period.” The Commission stressed
that many of the organizational and procedural steps it took were due to
a desire to finish proceedings as quickly as possible and help the victims
215
immediately.
This, however, effectively sacrificed actual and just
compensation to the victims. Instead, the Commission should have
committed more time to making its determination, if it meant that
ultimately the Commission could fairly compensate the victims.
Further, both the UNCC and the CRPC illustrate that the time
needed by the Commission to adequately compensate the victims should
not have been much longer than the Commission took to conclude. The
Commission spent almost ten years to reach a final decision on
awards.216 Furthermore, there has yet to be any payments made.217
Alternatively, the UNCC started in 1991 and had completely finished
218
processing claims by the end of 2005. It made its last payments in
219
220
2007. The CRPC was established in 1996 and ended in 2003. The
difference between these three commissions is negligible, considering
the benefit that could have been gained by taking the slightly longer
approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Commission has been successful in many regards. Professor
Won Kidane, who worked with Ethiopia during the Commission,
described many of its successes:
(1) It has contributed to the development of norms of international
humanitarian law in the civil compensation context, (2) it has
significantly contributed to the emerging consensus regarding the
status of some norms of international humanitarian law as customary
norms, (3) it has identified gaps in the existing standards of
214. Institutional and Procedural Aspects of Mass Claims Settlement Systems: The United
Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 150, at 20.
215. See EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, ¶ 16.
216. See id. at 644, 770.
217. Author’s correspondence with Sean D. Murphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 2, 2011).
218. U.N. COMPENSATION COMM’N, supra note 152.
219. Id.
220. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 23.
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international humanitarian law and suggested the development of
new norms to fill those gaps, (4) it has refined procedures and
evidentiary standards of adjudication for mass claims processes,
(5) it has clearly demonstrated that there is a feasible way to
determine civil liability for violations of international humanitarian
law occurring during and in the aftermath of armed conflict for the
compensation of victims of such violations, and most importantly,
(6) it has shown that determination of civil liability is a realistic
alternative and an important supplement to criminal prosecution as a
221
mechanism of enforcement of violations of humanitarian law.

Absent from this list, however, is “relief and compensation for the
victims of Eritrea–Ethiopia border war” and “peace and security in the
region.”
The Algiers Agreement provided a mandate for the Commission
that should have forced more individual claims, instead of allowing only
222
inter-State claims. There are good examples in recent history that
could have guided the Commission in processing these claims, resulting
in more substantial benefit to the individual victims.
In particular, there are five primary lessons that the Commission
should have learned. First, and most importantly, the Commission
should have focused on individuals instead of governments. The
Commission created a mass claims process, but it did not necessitate its
use or prioritize individual claims over government claims in the way
that the UNCC did. Second, the Commission should have allowed the
time necessary to run a modern mass claim process. Both the CRPC and
the UNCC were relatively short enterprises with ultimately very little
benefit in trying to keep stringent deadlines. Third, the Commission
should have abandoned its reliance on an adversarial approach, and
instead should have approached the violations of humanitarian
international law as an impartial investigatory organ like the CRPC and
the UNCC. The Commission also should have developed standardized
claim forms, such as the ones the CRPC and the UNCC utilized, to
assure consistency and efficiency. This would have reduced both costs
and time, while still allowing the Commission the flexibility to award
damages more easily to the victims of the war.
Fourth, the Commission should have allowed impartial experts and
organizations to file information directly to the Commission, instead of
221. Kidane, supra note 14, at 86.
222. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 67–68; Algiers Agreement,
supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 1.
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through the government parties, and should have conducted more of its
own independent research, much like how the UNCC had its own
unbiased reports on which to rely. This would have made it easier for
the Commission to finish its work more easily and more sufficiently.
Lastly, the Commission should have focused on remedies through a
long-term lens. Instead of discounting the amounts necessary for
compensation, the Commission should have followed the example of
the CRPC and granted remedies that might not have been as practical or
enforceable currently, but that could have become more meaningful and
feasible in the future.
The Commission and its commissioners worked extremely hard
and were extremely clever in their approach to problems that arose.
Nevertheless, due to many circumstances in and out of their control, the
result was a negligible award that most likely will not justly compensate
a majority of the victims or significantly further peace between Eritrea
and Ethiopia. This should serve as an example to the international
community when a similar situation arises in the future—that it is better
and not much more costly (in time or resources) to implement a modern
mass claims process that is effective in compensating victims and
furthering humanitarian goals than it is to adhere to a traditional
arbitration or judicial model.

